Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are an integral part of an organization's infrastructure. Without an IDS facility in place to monitor network and host activities, attempted and successful intrusion attempts may go unnoticed. This study proposed a Collaborative Knowledge Repository Architecture for Intrusion Detection (CK-RAID). It is based on a distributed network of computer nodes, each with their individual IDS with a centralized knowledge repository system, and firewall acting as a defence. When an unfamiliar attack hits any node, the first step the intrusion monitor takes is to request from Knowledge Repository Server the most effective intrusion response. To improve performance, Intrusion Update module collaborates with IDSs sensor and log by updating their expert rule and intrusion information respectively and removing the old intrusion signature from the knowledge base with the aid of Intrusion Detector Pruning. To ensure security of information exchange, RSA encryption and Digital Signature were used to encode information during transit. The result showed that CK-RAID had a detection rate of 97.2%, compared with Medoid Clustering, Y-means, FCM and K-means that have an accuracy of 96.38%, 87.15%, 82.13% and 77.25% respectively. Therefore, CK-RAID can be deployed for efficient detection of all categories of intrusion detection and response.
Introduction
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an authorized way of identifying illegitimate users, attacks and vulnerabilities that could affect the proper functioning of computer systems, see Onashoga et al. [1] . The need for IDS can be summed up by a simple principle of network security defence in-depth, see Farooqi and Khan [2] .
Typically, heavy reliance is placed on protection and prevention using controls such as routers, firewalls, public key infrastructures, virtual private networks, and virus scanners. In contrast, critical detection and response functions such as those provided by intrusion detection systems are often overlooked. As such, there are no mechanisms to detect and respond to intrusion attempts that evade the first lines of defence, see Uddin and Rahman [3] . Intrusion detection is another type of security tool that was designed to protect and secure the information resources in the system. It complements firewalls by allowing a higher level of analysis of traffic on a network, and monitors the behaviour of the sessions on the servers, see Sharma and Singh 2016 [4] . Tiwari and Gour [5] added that current attacks cannot be thwarted by just blocking ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS). An intrusion detection system (IDS) is needed to detect and respond effectively whenever the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer resources are under attack, see Sandhu et al. [6] .
A distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS), consists of multiple intrusion detection systems (IDS) placed over a large network communicating with each other, or with a central server that facilitates advanced network monitoring, incident analysis, and instant attack data. These co-operative systems distributed across a network, enable incident analysts, network operators and security personnel to get a broader view of what is occurring on their network as a whole or node. The current state of IDS technology is not yet fully reliable, which makes the area of IDS an attractive and still open research field. A major problem with current IDS is their inability to guarantee intrusion detection (low accuracy): the current IDS technology is not accurate enough to provide reliable detection, see Sharma and Singh [4] . The Knowledge-based IDSs are considered good but their completeness is not based on the fact that they detect all possible attacks but by regular update of knowledge about the attacks, see Tiwari et al. [7] . They have been identified as possible solution to resolving some major anomalies of other variants of IDS if made, see Uddin and Rahman [3] , Tiwari et al. [7] .
In this study, a collaborative knowledge repository architecture for intrusion detection is proposed with a secure knowledge base and robust inference engine with a view to optimise attack detection and update rate of known and newly emerging attacks so as to update the knowledge and the inference rules having classified the new alerts as attacks, timely and regularly.
Related Work
It is not surprising that a lot of research work has been put into developing techniques to mitigate intrusion detection. In this section, a review of related work on collaborative intrusion detection systems was conducted. Yang et al. [8] proposed a scheme called Coordinated Attack Response and Detection Systems (CARDS), that uses a signature-based model for resolving issues. It consists of signature manager, monitor and directory services. The system collects data in a flexible, distributed manner and the detection processes are decentralized among various monitors and event-driven. CARDS generate and distribute detection tasks among monitors to cooperatively detect attacks. Detection tasks are parts of an attack signature, which the authors refer to as predefined queries.
A collaborative framework for intrusion detection networks (CIDNs) that uses a Bayesian approach for feedback aggregation was proposed by Fung et al. [9] . The approach was designed to solve the problem of traditional intrusion detection systems such as host-based intrusion detection system and network-based intrusion detection system, which can easily be compromised by new or unknown attacks. Collaboration among IDSs enables each IDS to use collective information and experience from other IDSs to achieve more accurate intrusion detections. CIDN employs an overlay network that connects IDSs to exchange information with each other, which helps in minimizing the combined cost of missed detection and false alarm. However, CIDN is a passive IDS with a decentralized architecture. In another related work by Fung et al. [10] , bayesian learning was used to select and maintain a list of collaborators which they can consult about intrusions.
Reputation-based collaborative intrusion detection network has also been used to lessen the impact of malicious alarms. Pérez et al. [11] designed a collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) that is capable of building and sharing collective knowledge about isolated alarms in order to efficiently and accurately detect distributed attacks. The authors' model is structured in a modular way by clustering the closest autonomous IDSs in groups. These groups are available to share and combine their collective knowledge of each other inside the same administrative domain, while a small group of them are available to share high-level information among the administrative domains involved in the collaborative detection process. In order to avoid the spread of false alert within the system, a Wise Committee (WC) is saddled with the responsibility of disseminating information with the rest of internal members. However, this research did not address the issue of data privacy. Sharma and Singh [4] proposed an approach to enhance the collaborative decision making by conducting polls between registered intrusion detection systems in a network. Intrusion activity for new packets and false positives is decided based on all opinions gathered from registered intrusion detection systems.
The logical structure is based on the action taken by the Knowledge Repository Server (KRS) to ascertain the existence of an attack, which in turn aids the subsequent decision taken on a reoccurrence of such an attack at any other node. The diagram of the logical structure is shown in Figure 1 . The CK-RAID comprises of three major components, namely Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Knowledge Repository Server (KRS) and External Modular Components.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The IDS comprises of IDS log, sensor and response module.
The IDS Log
The IDS log enables an administrator to review any suspicious network traffic, though logs cannot be solely depended upon when deploying Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
In the work of Ranjan and Sahoo [12] , an anomaly intrusion detection which uses K-medoids method of clustering (data mining approach) for detecting possible intrusion and attacks was proposed. KDD Cup99 was used to test the algorithm with the result of 96.38% of accuracy and 3.20% of false alert. The weakness of this work is the user to root attack, and lack of data privacy which was not addressed.
A hybrid architecture for distributed intrusion detection system in wireless network was proposed by Rashida [13] . The author built an IDS that uses agents as their lowest-level element for data collection and analysis and employs a structure to allow for scalability using both misuse (signature-based) detection and anomaly (behaviour-based) detection types of intrusion detection. The proposed IDS architecture consists of seven modules -Tracker, Anomaly Detection Module, Misuse Detection Module, Monitor, Signature Generator, Inference Detection Module and Countermeasure Module combining the results of the three detection modules. The proposed architecture has several shortcomings; detection of intrusions at the Inference Module is delayed until all the necessary information gets there from the agents. This is a problem common to distributed IDSs.
Methodology
The general architecture of Collaborative Knowledge Repository Architecture for Intrusion Detection (CK-RAID) is based on a distributed network of computer nodes, each with their individual IDS with a centralized knowledge repository system, and firewall as the first line of defense against attacks.
CK-RAID architecture can be viewed from two perspectives: operational structure and logical structure. The operational structure is based on the physical layout of the CK-RAID. The CK-RAID is protected by a firewall as its first line of defence, which first analyses both incoming and outgoing packets for access authorization. However, the IDSs basically detect and report network intrusions with improved performance in collaboration with the Knowledge Repository Server (KRS). because a determined hacker may easily flood the network to the extent that the log reaches its capacity and fails. Depending upon the operating system of the IDS, a hacker may also compromise the IDS and easily delete information in the log. On the other hand, all false positives will also be present in the log. If there is a large number of false positives, this can be quite annoying to the person who has to review the log. However, it is important to use the IDS log to search for any possible threats. If the IDS detects a match between current network activity and an attack in the signatures database, it will document the attempted attack in a log.
Sensor
The sensor of the IDS is located in a particular host to monitor system-level behaviour and acts as a sniffer of network traffic in promiscuous mode. The console is the point of central management for an IDS system. By using the console, an administrator may take notice of any current attack alerts. In many cases, the console may be used to customize certain preferences for the IDS. IDS sensor will also send an alert to the console regarding the attack.
Response Module
This is the component module of the IDS in the CK-RAID layout, whose duty is to return action from an intrusion event which could either be false positive or false negative. It identifies intrusion actions sniffed by the sensor on the protected system on the network and also gets details of old intrusion from the IDS log.
Knowledge Repository Server (KRS)
The knowledge repository server (KRS) consists of the following components:
Knowledge Base
The knowledge base handles the building and sharing of a collective knowledge about isolated alerts that have been detected individually by autonomous IDSs using a schema system. This system provides symbolic structure for encoding, representing and storing intrusion signature data into the knowledge base in structured form. The main goal of these cooperative systems is to extend the capability of individual IDSs to detect and respond to alerts beyond its individual experience. Also, KB uses a knowledge filtering technology known as the recommender module to mine and recommend intrusion responses to intrusion upon request by any node when they are faced with any new threat.
Recommender Module
The recommender module takes in intrusion parameters such as Intruder Port, Intruder IP, Target Port, and Target services as input, and computes the closest intrusion response based on the previous responses. The intrusion response set is built by getting all the intrusion responses where intrusion parameter(s) matches any of the input intrusion parameters, using the Hunt's Algorithm that grows a decision tree (as shown in Algorithm 1) in a recursive fashion by partitioning the dataset into successively purer subsets, using the following if-then procedures. Returnfor all split criteria C:
Let Dt be the dataset of a node t, the general recursive procedure is defined as:
• if Dt contains records that belong to the same class yt, then t is a leaf node labeled as yt,
• if Dt is an empty set, then t is a leaf node labeled by the default class, yd,
• if Dt contains records that belong to more than one class, use an attribute test to split the data into smaller subsets.
It recursively applies the procedure to each subset until all the records in the subset belong to the same class.
Security Enhanced Module (SEM)
This consists of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and RSA cryptosystem for information encryption, decryption and role verification, which involves key generation, encryption, decryption, signature and verification.
There are four components of SEM:
1. Node Registration Module which assigns an identifier and security parameters to every node that joins the intrusion knowledge community.
The Node Request Generation
Module which takes the intrusion parameters and the session key of the requesting nodes to produce the cipher text, which the server uses to compare with the node id for verification purpose before authentication.
Knowledge Server Response Generation
Module decrypts the cipher text to get the intrusion parameters to check if there are similar attack patterns in the database of the knowledge server. Once found, it recommends the best suggestion for the intrusion.
Node Response Retrieval
Module takes server's signature parameters, server public key, encrypted session key of server and private key of the node as input to produce the server plaintext session key used for symmetric key encryption. It then uses the cipher text of the server response and session key to produce the plaintext response which is the actual response to the intrusion parameters.
CK-RAID External Modular Components
The external modular components of CK-RAID include Intrusion Update Module (IUM) and Intrusion Verifier Module (IVM).
(i) The IVM collaborates with the IDS sensor in verifying the existence of any suspicious/sniffed intrusions in the knowledge repository server. This module hints a particular node on the intrusion experiences of another systems node on the CK-RAID. Algorithm 2 describes this process. However, The IDP serves two purposes in this framework, first to reduce redundancy in the local and global knowledge, and also to increase the search and decision-making time when a new threat arrives at any node. As adopted by Onashoga et al. [14] , the Detector for Ageing Technology for Adaptive and Collaborative SMS Spam Filtering was employed to remove aged intrusion signature from the knowledge base and also to reduce computation time when accessing knowledge at the global scope. Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo-code description of the intrusion detection pruning process.
Implementation
To show the performance of CK-RAID, a virtual computing device per host was set up on a Linux server with the hardware configuration of Intel(R) core i7 @ 2.90 GHz, 4GB RAM, and 500GB HDD running on Snort IDS, which is an open source IDS that relies on packet dumping application. WinPcap was used to detect network intrusion. This phase requires every new node that joins the intrusion knowledge community to register the node to the community. This phase is required to assign an identifier to the node and also to generate a security parameter for the node administrator. If(IsMatch! = Null){ t n + 1 .maptoClass(IsMatch); } else { createNewSigClass (g n + 1 ); assignToClass(t n + 1 , g n + 1 ) } IR k + 1 = add(tn, IR k + 1 ) //update IDS inference Rule TL n = add(t n , n + 1) //update IDS log DR k + 1 = add(t n , DR k + 1 ) // update knowledge inference Rule Dm = add(t n , m + 1) // update knowledge base dataset feedback = true; } return feedback; } Algorithm 4. Intrusion detection pruning algorithm Intrusion Ageing threshold t, current system daytime c, knowledge base intrusion set T, intrusion age t o , index i.
CK-RAID Implementation Interface
i ← 0; while (i < sizeOf (T)) ( t o = Difference (c, LastEntryDateTime (T [i])) if (t o ≥ t) { Delete(T [i]); ) else{ LastEntryDatetime(T [i]) = currentSystime(); Retain(T [i]); } endif } endwhile
Node Intrusion Monitor Phase
This phase scans the snort log for possible intrusion signature and raises alert whenever an intrusion hits any host on the node as shown in Figure 2 . 
Node Intrusion Detection and Response Request Phase
The intrusion monitor scans the IDS log for possible intrusion on any host. Each node can be attacked with either known attacks or unknown attacks. A known attack is an attack that the local intrusion monitor has the knowledge of and can easily respond to with the previous successful response. This type of attack may not request the attention of an administrator, but will log the intrusion and the response for the administrator to review later. Figure 3 shows the interface of response to known attacks.
When an unfamiliar attack hits any node, the first step taken by the intrusion monitor is to request from the Knowledge Repository Server (KRS) the most effective intrusion response to the intrusion. This is done with the following steps: On the other hand, where an unfamiliar attack does not have any replica in KRS, the KRS will suggest possible intrusion response that can neutralize that type of attack by using the knowledge recommender module, as shown in Figure 4 .
Knowledge Repository Server Intrusion Response Phase
In the Knowledge Repository Server, whenever an intrusion request comes in, the Knowledge Base (KB) performs the following steps: At this phase, the node retrieves the signed encrypted response and verifies signature on the response before decrypting the response and applying the response to the intrusion.
Performance Evaluation
The performance of CK-RAID was measured based on known and benchmarked metrics of Collaborative IDS which are timeliness, accuracy and robustness. Timeliness in collaborative intrusion detection system is the time taken for a node to get the analysis results of the intrusion parameters after initiating the request. Accuracy in intrusion detection is an essential property of the security system which is the question of information privacy and information filtering. These two features are combined to give accurate intrusion response to request by any node, while robustness is the question of how resilient is the collaborative system to attack, especially the insider attack.
The experiment consists of three nodes with a minimum of three hosts each. IDSs were placed on each node to detect and respond to intrusion alert. The experiment was performed using putty to telnet connections to systems with twenty different types of simulated attacks.
Some of the alerts were known by some IDS in the environment and recorded as known attack by the different IDS in the simulated environment. Ten (10) out of the simulated attacks were picked at random and launched to the three nodes at random. The time taken for the knowledge server to generate a response in seconds was recorded for the ten experiment runs, which is shown in Table 1 . CK-RAID was compared with the existing related framework of intrusion detection system, in order to measure its effectiveness. Specifically, 5% of KDD Cup 99 dataset which contains about 2,454,431 intrusion set of about 20 different intrusion types were used as an input to conduct further experiment. 600,000 data points out of the intrusion set were considered as the input, 70% for training and 30% for testing. The results yielded 97.2% accuracy and false positive rate of 3.12%. The result of the experiment is represented in Table 2 . CK-RAID result shows 0.8% increase in detection accuracy when compared with Ranjan and Sahoo (2014) who presented clustering approach for anomaly intrusion detection with the accuracy of 96.38% and false positive rate of 3.2%. Figure 5 is a graphical description of the accuracy (%) and false alarm comparison between CK-RAID, medoid clustering, and three other algorithms. 
Conclusion
This research work presents a collaborative knowledge filtering driven by decision tree algorithm to classify intrusions so as to improve the accuracy of intrusion detection and intrusion response. RSA encryption and digital signature were used to secure the information exchange among the nodes in the distributed network environment. The pfSense firewall was used to simulate the distributed network environment. The result obtained shows an increase in the timeliness of the intrusion detection and response, as well as the accuracy in intrusion detection and response.
